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THE CANADIAN 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
AND OFFSHORE IMPORTS: 
CAN THE AUTO PACT HELP? 
Susan L. Wood 
Introduction 
In recent years, growing numbers of im-
ported motor vehicles have been entering the 
Canadian market. A5 a result, the Canadian 
motor vehicle industry has been weakened. The 
Automotive Products Trade Agreement (Auto 
Pact) with the United States has rationalized 
the North American automotive industry and 
has improved Canada's position. By extending 
the major provisions of this agreement to all 
automobile sellers dealing in Canada, the 
Canadian government can strengthen its motor 
vehicle industry once more. 
In this paper, I will examine the impor-
tance of the automotive industry to Canada's 
economy. I will then describe the industry and 
show how the Auto Pact has helped Canada. 
Next, I will look at the negative effects brought 
about by the increase in imports from offshore 
countries. Finally, I will make some recom-
mendations for change and will show those 
recommendations can be implemented. 
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Importance of the Automotive 
Industry to Canada's Economy 
The automotive industry is a major con-
tributor to Canada's economic well-being.It is 
a major consumer of steel, iron, aluminum, 
copper, rubber, plastics, textiles, glass, chemi-
cals, machinery, and electrical products. Nearly 
one in seven Canadian manufacturing jobs 
depends directly or indirectly on the continued 
health of the automotive industry. 
A5 can be seen in Table 1, the output of 
many Canadian industries is dependent on the 
automotive industry. Foundries, which em-
ployed 10,400 Canadians in 1978, rely on the 
automotive industry to consume 36.7% of their 
output. Iron and steel plants, with 56,200 em-
ployees in 1978, expect the automobile indus-
try to consume 16.9% of their output. Cana-
da's mining industry also depends in large part 
on the iron and steel manufacturers. Although 
these figures are out of date, they are the only 
ones available at this time as they represent 
special calculations made by Statistics Canada 
for the Federal Task Force on the Canadian 
Table 1 
Dependence of Key Manufacturing Sectors on Shipments 
to the Automotive Industry-1978 
Industry 
Foundries 
Battery Manufacturers 
Iron and Steel 
Rubber Products 
Machine Shops 
Aluminum Rolling and Extruding 
Wire Products 
Copper and Alloy Rolling 
Metal Casting and Extruding 
Metal Stamping 
Glass Products 
Miscellaneous Metal Fabricating 
Paint Manufacturers 
Radio and TV Receivers 
Plastics and Synthetic Resins 
Textiles Industry 
Plastic Fabricators 
Total Employees 
in Canada-1978 
10,400 
3,000 
56,200 
28,900 
12,200 
7,000 
18,800 
3,600 
5,200 
34,100 
11,600 
24,900 
7,400 
2,300 
5,478 
67,684 
31,441 
Percentage of Output 
Dependent on the 
Automotive Industry 
36.7 
17.3 
16.9 
16.9 
15.2 
14.2 
13.1 
12.9 
12.9 
8.3 
8.2 
8.0 
8.0 
5.9 
4.7 
3.8 
3.0 
Source: Special Statistics Canada tabulations for the Federal Task Force on the Canadian Motor Vehicle and 
Automotive Parts Industries from the 1978 national input/output model. 
Motor Vehicle and Automotive Parts Indus-
tries. Obviously, many interdependent sectors 
of Canada's economy would be injured by a 
weakening of the automotive industry. 
In 1982,93,567 persons were employed by 
motor vehicle, parts, and accessories manufac-
turers. Since much of this employment is con-
centrated in communities in Ontario and Quebec, 
the importance of the automotive industry to 
these local communities can be readily seen. In 
addition, interprovincial trade flows are signifi-
cant. Resources from the West are processed 
into finished automobiles and parts in the 
East. 
The automotive industry is also con-
sidered to be very important to the develop-
ment of technology. Computers and other micro-
electronic devices are increasingly being used 
in automobiles. Lightweight metals and high 
strength plastics are also being developed. 
Chrysler's assembly plant in Windsor makes 
extensive use of robots in welding and painting 
operations. Ford's Essex Engine Plant is using 
etching lasers to mark engines with codes that 
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can later be read by other lasers, making it pos-
sible to sort and identify individual engines 
throughout the manufacturing process. Clearly, 
if the health of her automotive industry deteri-
orates, then Canada will lose some of her access 
to the cutting edge of technology. 
The Canadian Auto Industry Before 
the Auto Pact 
Regulatory Environment 
The Canadian automobile industry has a 
history of protectionism. In the late nineteenth 
century, a duty of 35% was levied on imported 
gasoline buggies. This policy led to the forma-
tion of some Canadian auto companies, but its 
main result was to encourage the large Ameri-
can manufacturers to establish facilities in 
Canada. Ford Motor Company of Canada was 
formed in Windsor, Ontario in 1904; Chevrolet 
joined Canadian McLaughlin in 1918 to form 
General Motors of Canada Limited; and The 
Chrysler Corporation of Canada was organized 
in 1921 at Windsor. 
In 1926, the Canadian government be-
came concerned that the high tariff was caus-
ing Canadian consumers to pay higher prices 
for cars than in the United States. Because of 
this concern, a duty remission plan was in-
stituted. Up to 25% of the tariff due on imported 
parts would be withdrawn provided that at least 
50% of the completed vehicle was produced in 
Canada. This plan not only reduced the tariff 
and thus the price to the consumer, but it also 
helped to ensure that automotive production 
would be maintained in Canada. It was the 
first to introduce a "Canadian content" 
requirement. -
In the early 1930s, the Canadian govern-
ment tried to increase production and employ-
ment to help offset the ill effects of the 
Depression. To achieve this aim, tariffs were 
raised and prohibitions were placed on im-
ported used vehicles. In 1936, tariffs were low-
ered but the Canadian content requirement 
was raised from 50% to 60%. 
In 1961, the Bladen Royal Commission 
reported that low yolume production was the 
cause of under-prdductivity in the Canadian 
automotive industty. The Commission con-
cluded that this issue could not be addressed 
through tariff protedtion, and therefore recom-
mended a plan whereby the Canadian content 
requirements would be extended to vehicle 
sales, not to the cost of vehicles produced in 
Canada. The required content was to be a per-
centage of the sum of the cost of manufacture 
for vehicles made in Canada plus the value 
used to assess duty on imported vehicles plus 
the value used to assess duty on imported re-
placement parts. This plan would provide 
Canadian manufacturers with the increased 
market necessary to support longer production 
runs and thus lower per-unit costs (Keeley, 
1983). 
In 1963, a broad duty remission plan was 
implemented. Under this plan, duties owed on 
vehicles and parts imported by companies in 
Canada would be remitted in proportion to the 
company's exports of vehicles and parts. This 
led to an immediate increase in investment in 
Canada and in Canadian exports to the United 
States. U.S. manufacturers reacted strongly 
against this plan, however. One, the Modine 
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Manufacturing Company, filed a petition with 
the U.S. Commissioner of Customs charging 
that the plan constituted a bounty or grant on 
the exportation of Canadian-made automotive 
parts to the United States. Modine requested 
that a countervailing duty of 25% be applied to 
such imports. To guard against the possibility 
of retaliatory measures, the two governments 
negotiated the United States-Canada Automo-
tive Products Trade Agreement (Auto Pact). 
Industry Environment 
Historically, most of the automotive pro-
duction occurring in Canada has been assembly. 
Components such as engines have been imported, 
mainly from the United States. Assembly is a 
labor intensive process, and does not require 
the same level of capital investment that pro-
duction does. The mostly American-owned fa-
cilities were little more than branch plants of 
the Big Four American auto makers. Much of 
Canada's local content legislation has evolved 
from the effort to attract capital investment. 
Prior to 1965, most of the cars sold in 
Canada were assembled there. Many different 
models were produced in short production runs. 
Most manufacturers offered most of their prod-
uct lines in Canada, but because of Canada's 
smaller population in relation to the United 
States, fewer cars of each model were sold there. 
For example, a manufacturer might have sold 
120,000 units of a certain model in the U.S., but 
only 12,000 units of that model in Canada. The 
economies of scale achieved with the United 
States production of 120,000 units were thus 
not available to the Canadian production run 
of only 12,000 units. 
It was under this scenario that the Cana-
dian government desired to rationalize its au-
tomotive industry. A trade agreement which 
would allow free trade across the Canadian bor-
der (provided that certain Canadian content 
rules were met) seemed to be in order. And so, 
the Auto Pact was born in 1965. 
The Auto Pact 
The Auto Pact was aimed at rationalizing 
the North American automotive industry. It 
allowed free trade between the United States 
and Canada in original equipment parts and 
new vehicles under certain conditions spelled 
out in the agreement. These conditions are: 
1. Vehicles and parts eligible to enter 
the United States must come from 
Canada and contain at least 50% 
North American content. 
2. Only companies making cars or 
trucks in Canada may be desig-
nated to participate under the 
Pact. 
3. Each designated manufacturer 
must maintain a certain ratio be-
tween the net sales value of vehi-
cles made in Canada and the net 
sales value of vehicles sold there. 
The ratio for each class of vehicle 
is to be the greater of 75% or the 
level achieved in the base year 
beginning August 1, 1963. For 
example, for every $1,000,000 
worth of vehicles sold in Canada, 
$750,000 worth would have to be 
produced in Canada. 
4. The amount of Canadian value 
added (CVA) for all classes of vehi-
cles made in Canada is to be at 
least as great as the amount that 
was achieved in the base year on a 
nominal basis. 
1\vo additional conditions regarding Ca-
nadian value added were specified in the "let-
ters of undertaking" signed by the manufac-
turers who desired to participate in the Auto 
Pact. The purpose of these conditions was to 
produce an early increase in the level of CVA 
and provide for continuing increases in line 
with the growth of the Canadian market and 
the rate of price increase (Task Force, p. 18). 
These conditions are: 
1. In each model year, the value 
added in Canada should amount 
to at least 60% of the growth in 
the value of cars sold in Canada 
over the value of cars sold in the 
base year; for commercial vehi-
cles, the value added should 
amount to at least 50% of the 
growth in the value of commer-
cial vehicles sold in the base year. 
For example, for every $100,000 
of growth in sales value of cars, 
there would have to be at least 
$60,000 additional CVA 
2. Designated vehicle manufac-
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turers were collectively to in-
crease the amount of Canadian 
value added between 1965 and 
1968 by a further $260 million (in 
nominal terms). 
Canada implemented the Auto Pact on a mul-
tilateral basis, while the United States ob-
tained a waiver from GATT to implement it on a 
preferential basis for Canada. Currently, for-
eign sellers have three options for gaining ac-
cess to the Canadian automotive market. They 
can manufacture and sell under the Auto Pact, 
they can manufacture and sell but not under 
the Auto Pact, or they can import vehicles from 
their home countries. 
The Canadian Auto Industry After the 
Auto Pact 
In 1964, Canadian automotive imports 
from the U.S. totaled C$716,675. This ac-
counted for 86% of all Canadian auto imports. 
With this in mind, one can easily see why 
Canada felt the need to negotiate an automo-
tive trade agreement with the United States. 
In the years since its inception, the Auto 
Pact has proven to be beneficial to Canada. In 
1968, the automotive industry was the largest 
export industry in Canada, with sales of C$2.6 
billion (Dykes, p. 65). By 1985, this figure had 
grown to C$33.2 billion (Table 2). Employment 
has also grown under the Auto Pact. In 1963, 
52,708 persons were employed by manufactur-
ers of motor vehicles, parts, and accessories. In 
1970, this number increased to 83,457, and by 
1979 it was 107,703. Similar growth has been 
realized in the area of capital expenditures. In 
1964, capital expenditures by motor vehicle 
manufacturers, motor vehicle parts and acces-
sories manufacturers, and truck body and trailer 
manufacturers totaled C$75.4 million. By 1972, 
this figure had risen to C$101.8 million and in 
1979 it was C$484.0 million. 
The Canadian Auto Industry Today 
When the Auto Pact was negotiated, the 
United States accounted for virtually all of the 
imports into the Canadian auto market. Today, 
that picture is radically altered. 
Overseas imports have gradually been 
making up a larger and larger share of the 
Table 2 
Import/Export in Automotive Products 
(Canadian S millions) 
Imports Exports 
from U.S. from overseas to U.S. to overseas 
1961 398 128 . . . ... 
1962 519 122 . . . ... 
1963 604 86 . . . ... 
1964 716 119 . . . ... 
1966 1,541 121 882 160 
1967 2,172 123 1,516 159 
1968 2,995 236 2,450 201 
1969 3,579 338 3,295 199 
1970 3,158 373 3,269 241 
1971 3,922 521 4,039 199 
1972 4,632 650 4,551 205 
1973 5,736 595 5,300 245 
1974 6,658 697 5,421 346 
1975 7,847 535 5,895 603 
1976 8,825 836 7,877 606 
1977 10,935 969 9,738 816 
1978 12,576 1,302 11,970 1,044 
1979 14,513 1,281 11,429 1,051 
1980 12,439 1,667 10,280 1,174 
1981 14,590 2,067 12,568 1,671 
1982 13,705 1,808 16,416 1,260 
1983 16,870 2,328 20,693 534 
1984 22,613 3,523 28,645 644 
1985 27,542 4,525 32,601 577 
1986 15,357 2,880 15,528 337 
(2 quarters) 
Source: Report of the Federal Task Force on the Canadian Motor Vehicle and Parts Industries, Bank of 
Canada Review (October 1983), and Facts and Figures of the Automotive Industry (Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturer's Association, 1965). 
Canadian automobile market. There are sev-
eral reasons for this shift. Concerns about fuel 
efficiency began to grow after the 1973 oil 
embargo. But while North American manufac-
turers were still producing big "gas guzzlers," 
the Japanese were producing smaller, high 
mileage cars. Also, high quality offshore im-
ports appealed to Canadians who were becom-
ing tired of what they perceived as defect-
ridden North American autos. Finally, because 
of various tax differences, differences in labor 
costs, and exchange rates, many imports en-
joyed a substantial cost advantage over North 
American made cars. 
At the same time that offshore imports 
have increased, however, total vehicle sales in 
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Canada have either decreased or remained 
steady. Thus, imports today are capturing a far 
greater share of the automobile market. In 
addition, because fewer American built cars are 
being sold in Canada, the Auto Pact requires 
that fewer cars be built by American firms in 
Canada. This has led to lower production and 
higher unemployment in the Canadian 
industry. 
As of 1985, overseas imports accounted 
for 30.1% of the 1.1 million cars sold in Canada, 
up from 25.4% in 1984 (Martin, 1986). Asian 
imports comprised 75% of this figure. Japanese 
and Korean automobiles have a distinct advan-
tage in Canada. As a government policy, the 
tariff is decreasing and thus is lessening in 
importance as a deterrent to overseas imports. 
David Rehor, treasurer of Ford Motor Company 
of Canada, puts it this way: "An 11% tariff is 
not scary to someone who enjoys a $2,000 cost 
advantage (in producing each car)" (quoted in 
Martin, 1986). Because of labor cost differences 
and different tax structures, the Japanese and 
Koreans do indeed enjoy a substantial cost 
advantage over North American producers. 
Executives of the Big Three auto makers 
claim that, since Asian auto makers are not 
subjecttoCanadian content rules, Asian plants 
located in Canada will employ far fewer workers 
than would similar American plants located in 
Canada. Because these plants are able to use 
imported parts, many of them are described as 
"knock-down" plants. Component parts are 
shipped from the home country and assembled 
at the Canadian plant. As Brian Hickey, secre-
tary-treasurer of the Canadian Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturer's Association, states, "Those 
(Japanese and Korean) plants are basically 
complete knock-down operations. They are very 
low-intensity labor plants" (quoted in Johnson, 
1986). For example, the new Hyundai plant in 
Quebec is expected to employ 1200 workers. 
According to Stephen Van Houten, manager of 
business planning and trade policy for General 
Motors Canada, it would have to employ 4000 
people in order to comply with the Canadian 
content provisions of the Auto Pact. He com-
plains further that the Pact has "lost its focus" 
and applies "to a smaller and smaller portion of 
the industry every passing year'' (Martin, 1986). 
Recommendations for Change 
It has been shown that Canada's auto-
motive industry has been injured by the in-
creased level of overseas imports. Overseas 
companies, particularly the Japanese, enjoy a 
substantial cost advantage over Canadian 
manufacturers. Although Canadian companies 
can cut down the labor cost advantage of the 
Japanese by boosting productivity, there is 
nothing they can do about the Japanese tax 
structure. This type of difference must be ad-
dressed by trade policy. 
Canada's trade policy in regards to auto-
mobiles has remained virtually unchanged 
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over the past twenty years. When the Auto Pact 
was negotiated in 1965, it served Canada's 
needs. The United States was the major ex-
porter of cars into Canada, and the Auto Pact 
led to the rationalization of the North American 
auto industry. Since 1965, however, the struc-
ture of the Canadian auto market has changed. 
Imports from overseas are comprising a larger 
share than ever before. 
Although Canada implemented the Auto 
Pact on a multilateral basis, other countries 
have not joined the United States in participat-
ing under the Pact. It is difficult to understand 
why this has not occurred. Canada is the world's 
seventh largest market for vehicles.Westem 
Canada has the raw materials needed by the 
industry in abundance. Other industries, such 
as foundries, battery manufacturing, iron and 
steel, rubber, metal rolling and extruding, glass 
products, and paint manufacturing, have long 
been supplying the automotive industry. Cana-
da's skilled labor force is becoming accus-
tomed to modem manufacturing methods and 
thus is increasing its productivity. In addition, 
Canada is close to major automotive produc-
tion centers in the United States. In short, 
Canada should be attractive to the automotive 
industry as a location for production. 
Of course, there are reasons why overseas 
firms would prefer to produce at home and ship 
vehicles overseas. Automotive production is 
capital intensive and requires careful planning 
and cooperation between producers and sup-
pliers. Foreign operations require running bus-
inesses according to foreign laws and regu-
lations and understanding of foreign labor and 
business practices. It may simply be easier for 
foreign producers to produce on their "home 
turf." As Mr. Rehor of Ford (Canada) has stated, 
an 11% tariff is really not a deterrent to a pro-
ducer who enjoys a substantial cost advantage 
by producing in his home country and export-
ing to Canada. 
The intent of the Auto Pact was to estab-
lish "the fundamental policy that automotive 
companies that participate in the Canadian 
market invest, provide employment, and create 
value within that market commensurate with 
the benefit they derive from it" (Task Force, p. 
106). The North American vehicle manufac-
turers participating under the Pact have worked 
to uphold its provisions, but these producers 
are no longer the sole actors in the Canadian 
marketplace. Importers are deriving benefits 
from selling in the Canadian market, but are 
not contributing to the Canadian automotive 
industry. 
In order to continue protecting her vital 
automotive industry, Canada must extend the 
provisions of the Auto Pact to all producers 
who sell in the Canadian market. By requiring 
all sellers to have a dollar value of Canadian 
production at least equal to the dollar value of 
their Canadian sales and to achieve 60% CVA, 
the continued viability and growth of Canada's 
automotive industry can be assured. The Fed-
eral Task Force on the Canadian Motor Vehicle 
and Automotive Parts Industries has made the 
following recommendations to the Govern-
ment of Canada: 
The Task Force ... recommends that 
the Government of Canada pursue a 
trade policy that will require all vehi-
cle manufacturers who sell vehicles 
in the Canadian market to make 
binding commitments comparable 
to the commitments now being made 
by the vehicle manufacturers operat-
ing under the Auto Pact. 
A step by step arrangement and an 
effective compliance procedure must 
be developed by the Canadian gov-
ernment that will ensure that these 
comparable commitments will be 
fulfilled by 1987. 
For those vehicle companies already 
manufacturing in Canada under the 
Auto Pact, the existing compliance 
procedure will remain in effect. How-
ever, once a comparability of com-
mitment has been achieved by all 
vehicle manufacturers selling in 
Canada, then the Government of 
Canada should negotiate an agree-
ment with all vehicle companies to 
increase the level of minimum com-
mitments to the Canadian economy. 
As part of this new trade policy, in-
centives should be established to en-
courage the further development and 
expansion of a world-competitive in-
digenous Canadian automotive parts 
industry (Task Force, 1983). 
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These recommendations would have to be 
phased in over a period of three to four years. 
Producers who sell very few vehicles in Canada 
(the Task Force categorizes this group as sellers 
of 0-3,000 vehicles per year in Canada) should 
be allowed to import under the current duty 
structure. Sellers of moderate numbers of vehi-
cles (3,001-28,000 according to the Task Force 
guidelines) should face lower CVA require-
ments and a proportionately smaller duty. They 
should then gradually be fqrced to meet the 
requirements of the Auto Pact. As they achieve 
this goal, they would be permitted to sell goods 
in Canada duty-free. In this way, smaller pro-
ducers would not be shut out of the Canadian 
market, but would still be required to con-
tribute something to Canada, whether by pay-
ing the duty or by producing products with 
some Canadian content. 
Canada can expect to benefit a great deal 
under the proposed trade framework. Employ-
ment, for example, would be markedly increased. 
In addition to the direct employment added by 
offshore producers producing in Canada and/ 
or purchasing Canadian-made parts, employ-
ment in support industries, such as iron and 
steel, rubber, glass, and chemicals, could also 
be expected to grow. 
Investment in the Canadian industry can 
also be expected to increase dramatically. If the 
largest foreign sellers were required to produce 
in Canada, substantial capital investment would 
be necessary. Automotive production is highly 
capital intensive, and thus large amounts of 
capital could be expected to flow into the Ca-
nadian economy. 
Productivity will increase as well. The 
Japanese currently use many of the most mod-
em manufacturing methods, notably just-in-
time (JIT) inventory and robotics. They could 
be expected to continue using these efficient 
techniques in Canada, thus raising the produc-
tivity of the Canadian worker. Research and 
development of technology in Canada would 
also benefit from the new trade policy. The 
Japanese are on the forefront of technological 
development in automotive manufacturing, 
and it can be expected that new technologies 
would be used in the Canadian-Japanese plants. 
Although the Japanese may not locate their 
research and development facilities in Canada, 
they would certainly use any newly developed 
technologies in their Canadian plants. 
Of course, there will be some disadvan-
tages to this program. One reason for the growth 
of imports in the Canadian market has been 
that the imports have had lower prices than 
their North American counterparts. Because 
plants operating under the Auto Pact will have 
higher costs, prices can be expected to rise 
somewhat. 
Conclusions 
Canada's automotive industry is crucial to 
her economic well-being. Although the current 
trade policy was effective when it was first 
negotiated, conditions in the marketplace have 
changed and the policy no longer protects the 
industry from the flood of offshore imports. As a 
result, Canada must update her automotive 
trade policy so that importers who derive bene-
fits from selling in Canada must provide bene-
fits to Canada. In order to do this, Canada must 
extend the Canadian value-added and produc-
tion-to-sales ratio requirements of the Auto 
Pact to all vehicle producers who sell in Canada. 
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